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ESSAY

Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.*
In its 1984 opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,' the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the
long standing conflict concerning the proper scope of judicial review of
agency interpretations of statutory provisions.2 Chevron concerned the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the Clean
Air Act, which requires the EPA to limit emissions from all "stationary
sources." The EPA interpreted the statutory term "stationary source"
to mean an entire plant, rather than an individual piece of combustion
equipment. That statutory interpretation was adopted as part of the
EPA's "bubble concept," which is based on the EPA's belief that it can
simultaneously further the inherently conflicting goals of the Clean Air
Act-improved air quality and continued economic growth-most effectively by imposing emission limitations on an entire plant, and by conferring upon the owner of the plant both the obligation and discretion
to determine the means by which to reduce plant emissions.
In defining the proper scope of judicial review of agency interpretations of statutory provisions, the Chevron Court established what one
judge calls the "Chevron two-step."' 3 The first step requires the court to
determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques* George W. Hutchison Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; co-author, R.
P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (1985).

PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO &

1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See 5 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29:9-29:16 (2d ed. 1984); Woodward &
Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REv. 329 (1979).
3. See Starr, Sunstein, Willard, Morrison & Levin, JudicialReview of Administrative Action
in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 360 (1987) [hereinafter JudicialReview Debate].
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tion at issue," in which case "the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."4 If the court
concludes, however, that "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue," the court must refrain from any statutory interpretation of its own and must simply determine "whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. ' 5 The
Chevron test established a simple approach to a traditionally complicated issue in administrative law. The court first decides whether the
statute resolves the specific issue or is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the issue. If it determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous, the
court then affirms the agency's interpretation of the statute if that interpretation is "reasonable."
In the three years since the Court decided Chevron, the case has
transformed dramatically the approach taken by courts in reviewing
agency interpretations of statutory provisions.6 The Supreme Court has
continued to interpret and apply Chevron in the manner previously described,' or, in Professor Cass Sunstein's terminology, the "strong"
reading of Chevron.8 While appellate courts use Chevron as the starting
point in reviewing agency interpretations of statutory provisions, appellate judges seem to have interpreted Chevron differently. Some judges
have adopted the "strong" reading of Chevron, while others have
adopted a "weak" reading that requires a court to resolve many of the
ambiguities in regulatory statutes.9
Several distinguished scholars and judges have criticized either
Chevron or the strong reading of Chevron. Professor Sunstein disagrees
passionately with the strong reading of Chevron and has serious reser4.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

5. Id. at 843.
6.

Judicial Review Debate, supra note 3, at 361. Chevron was cited in approximately 400

cases between 1984 and 1987. See 7B

SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS

323 (1986 & Supp.

1987).
7. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); see also Judicial Review Debate, supra note 3, at 36162.
8. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 3, at 367.

9. For illustrations of the differing interpretations of Chevron, see Marathon Oil Co. v.
United States, 807 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987); Center for Auto
Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 747 F.2d 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 930 (1985). Chief Judge Wald describes the D.C. Circuit's
approach to Chevron in the following manner: "[O]ur circuit initially took a fairly rigid approach
to the case, deferring to agencies in a wide array of situations.. . . Today, however, our court is
inching back towards a more balanced stance, allowing greater space for judicial legal interpretations ..
" Wald, The Contributionof the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law (manuscript to be
published in Spring 1988 issue of 40 ADMIN. L. REV.). Judge Wald describes a similar transformation in the Fifth Circuit. Id.; see also Judicial Review Debate, supra note 3, at 367.
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vations about its entire analytical framework. 10 Judge Breyer has expressed similar reservations. 1 In addition, at least some members of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
have narrowly interpreted the scope of Chevron. In Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2 the D.C. Circuit
held that the Chevron test applies only "in circumstances in which an
agency is required to apply a legal standard to a particular set of
facts.

' 13

In all other cases in which an agency interprets an ambiguous

provision in the statute that grants the agency its legal power, the
court's role is "to use traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain congressional intent.' 14 The D.C. Circuit based this holding on

dictum in a recent Supreme Court opinion. 5
This Essay views Chevron as an exceedingly important development in administrative law that represents a dramatic improvement
over prior attempts to grapple with the proper scope of judicial review
of agency interpretations of statutory provisions.' 6 This Essay argues
that the strong reading of Chevron is the proper interpretation because
agencies are the best equipped institutions to resolve policy questions
in the statutes that grant the agency its legal power. In addition, a
strong reading of Chevron will result in a number of positive consequences in the process of policy making in the modern administrative
10. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 3, at 366-71; see also Bresgal v. Brock, 833 F.2d 763
(9th Cir. 1987) (weak interpretation of Chevron).
11. Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 372-82
(1986).
12. 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

13.
14.

Id. at 113.
Id.

15.

See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). The Cardoza-Fonsecamajority's

alleged intent to narrow the scope of Chevron is difficult to discern. Justice Stevens' opinion on
behalf of a five Justice majority contains language that lends some support to the D.C. Circuit's
interpretation. Id. at 1220-22. The three dissenting Justices in Cardoza-Fonsecaobviously rejected
the majority's position, id. at 1225-32 (Powell, J., dissenting), as did Justice Scalia in his concurrence. Id. at 1224-25 (Scalia, J., concurring). Most significantly, Justice Blackmun both joined in
the majority opinion and filed a concurring opinion in which he emphasized that the agency's
statutory interpretation was "strikingly contrary to [the] plain language and legislative history [of
the statute]." Id. at 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurring). If Justice Blackmun based his support only
on the agency's particularly erroneous interpretation of the statutory term in Cardoza-Fonseca,
then Chevron's scope is unchanged. If, however, Justice Blackmun intended no such reservation,
then Cardoza-Fonseca may limit the applicability of Chevron. Depending on the interpretation
given Justice Blackmun's position, the Court could have decided either five-to-four in favor of, or
five-to-four against, a narrowing of the scope of Chevron. In a concurring opinion in NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 426 (1987), four Justices
explicitly emphasized the "continuing. . . vitality" of Chevron and characterized as "mistaken[]"
the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Cardoza-Fonsecain Union of Concerned Scientists.
16. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESs 405-09 (1985);
Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and PoliticalTheory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv.
469, 486-88, 494-96, 505-07 (1985) [hereinafter Pierce, Political Theory].
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state.
The forceful criticisms of Chevron and the attempts to limit or
redefine the Chevron test are predicated on a misunderstanding of the
nature of the statutory interpretation issues that agencies and courts
frequently must resolve. Historically, interpretation of terms used in a
regulatory statute has been characterized as an issue of law. Thus, some
commentators distinguish between the proper scope of judicial review
of issues of law, including all agency interpretations of statutory provisions, and judicial review of issues of policy. 17 Professor Sunstein argues
that Chevron is inconsistent both with Marbury v. Madison", and the
Administrative Procedure Act' 9 because courts possess the exclusive responsibility to decide issues of law.2 0
This characterization of Chevron is based on a serious misunderstanding of the legislative process and the nature of the issue before a
court when it reviews an agency's interpretation of a provision in a regulatory statute. Many instances of statutory interpretation require an
agency to resolve policy issues, rather than legal issues. Viewed in this
light, the first step in the Chevron test requires a court to determine
whether the issue of statutory interpretation in question is an issue of
law or an issue of policy. If the court determines that it is reviewing an
agency's resolution of a policy issue, the court then moves to the second
part of the test and affirms the agency's interpretation of the statutory
provision-and its resolution of the policy issue-if the agency's interpretation is "reasonable."
In determining whether an agency's interpretation of a statute involves an issue of law or policy, it is useful to analyze and characterize
the issue prior to Congress' enactment of the statute in question. For
example, in Chevron most would agree that, prior to the enactment of
17. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 11, at 364. According to Judge Breyer, two legal doctrines
govern judicial review of agency action:
The first doctrine concerns the appropriate attitude of a reviewing court towards an agency's
interpretations of law, such as the law embodied in the statute that grants the agency its legal
powers. To what extent should a court make up its own mind, independently, about the
meaning of the words of the statute? The second doctrine concerns a reviewing court's attitude toward an agency's regulatory policy. How willing should a court be to set aside such a
policy as unreasonable, arbitrary or inadequately considered?
Id. Judge Breyer cites Chevron as an example of a case in which the court must review an agency's
interpretation of law. Id. at 372-82. According to Judge Breyer, the "airbags" case, Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), is
an example of judicial review of an agency's regulatory policy. Breyer, supra note 11, at 384-88. In
the "airbags" case the Supreme Court held that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration acted unreasonably in revoking Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which required automobile manufacturers to install "passive restraints" in new cars. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
20. Judicial Review Debate, supra note 3, at 366-71.
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the Clean Air Act, the question of whether to limit emissions at the
plant level or the level of each piece of combustion equipment is a pure
question of policy. This question is but one of hundreds of policy issues
that some institution of government must resolve in order to implement
any regulatory program to reduce air pollution. In the process of enacting the Clean Air Act, or any other regulatory statute, Congress invariably resolves some policy issues but leaves to some other institution of
government the task of resolving many other policy issues.
As the Court recognized in Chevron, Congress declines to resolve
policy issues for many different reasons: Congress simply may have neglected to consider the issue; Congress may have believed that the
agency was in a better position to resolve the issue; or finally, Congress
may not have been able to forge a coalition or simply may have lacked
the political courage necessary to resolve the issue, given that a resolution either way might damage the political future of many members of
Congress. 21 The general proposition that Congress cannot and does not
resolve all the policy issues raised by its creation of a regulatory scheme
probably is not at all controversial.
A more controversial point, however, may be that Congress resolves
very few issues when it enacts a statute empowering an agency to regulate. 22 Rather, Congress typically leaves the vast majority of policy issues, including many of the most important issues, for resolution by
some other institution of government.23 Congress accomplishes this
through several different statutory drafting techniques, including the
use of empty standards, lists of unranked decisional goals, and contradictory standards. 4 Thus, Congress declines to resolve many policy issues by using statutory language that is incapable of meaningful
definition and application.
When a court "interprets" imprecise, ambiguous, or conflicting
statutory language in a particular manner, the court is resolving a policy issue. Courts frequently resolve policy issues through a process that
purports to be. statutory interpretation but which, in fact, is not.25 For
lack of a better term, this process will be referred to as "creative" inter21. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
22. See Pierce, Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor
Lowi, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 391, 398-403 (1987); Steward, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L.
REv. 323, 325-27 (1987).
23. See Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 16, at 489-96. But see Breyer, supra note 11, at
370,
24. Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 16, at 473-81.
25. See Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?,THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23; see
aLso R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 88-235 (1976) (collecting excerpts from renowned scholars
and jurists explaining the manner in which judges act as "lawmakers" in the process of interpreting ambiguous statutes).
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pretation. Judicial decisions under the Sherman Act provide a good example of judicial policy making through creative statutory
interpretation. Whether through congressional inadvertence or by design, courts have interpreted the substantive standard stated in the
Sherman Act-whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
imposing an unreasonable "restraint of trade or commerce"-in many
different and inconsistent ways.26
As long as courts follow a process of reasoned decision making, judicial policy making through creative interpretation and application of
ambiguous statutory provisions is generally appropriate. The function
of a court is to resolve cases or controversies. By enacting a statute that
raises but does not resolve myriad policy issues, and by permitting parties to bring judicial actions pursuant to that statute, Congress has created a large number of cases or controversies that courts have no choice
but to resolve through a process that can only be characterized as judicial policy making. In the context of the Sherman Act, for example,
courts and commentators seem increasingly to recognize that judges
make antitrust policy.

7

Because Congress has declined to resolve many

of the policy decisions raised by the Sherman Act, and because no other
institution of government is available to fill that policy making void, the
courts regularly must make policy decisions in the guise of interpreting
the Sherman Act.
Some judicial policy making in the guise of statutory interpretation
seems superficially different from the typical judicial opinion interpreting the Sherman Act. Occasionally courts interpret statutory provisions
through lengthy discussions of congressional goals and legislative history. In some cases, this analysis undoubtedly is an exercise in what
may be termed "real" statutory interpretation; the judge is honestly
convinced from reading the language of the statute and its legislative
history that Congress resolved a policy issue in a particular manner.
When Congress has resolved a policy issue, the court is dealing with an
issue of law, in which case the court's role is limited to implementing
congressional intent.
In a high proportion of cases, however, an honest analysis of the
language, the congressional goals, and the legislative history of the statute will not support a holding that Congress actually resolved the policy
issue presented to the court.2 " This situation often arises because Con26. See Rogers, Perspectives on Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 12 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 301 (1981). Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) with
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See generally E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL (1986).
27. See supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973).
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gress frequently uses ambiguous or conflicting statutory language and
invariably promulgates inconsistent congressional goals. While sometimes helpful, the legislative history of a statute is often unclear, inconsistent, or untrustworthy. 9
In many cases in which a search for congressional intent is futile,
courts nevertheless purport to resolve conflicts concerning the meaning
of specific provisions in a statute through the process of statutory interpretation. In actuality, however, these courts are resolving a policy issue
that Congress raised but declined to resolve.3 0 The judge's personal political philosophy influences greatly his resolution of the policy issue. As
in the context of the Sherman Act, policy making is an appropriate and
inevitable judicial role, because the judiciary, as the only institution
empowered to resolve cases or controversies, must make the policy decisions necessary to decide a particular case or controversy. The exception to this proposition is in the context of administrative law.
Like a court, an agency frequently makes policy when it interprets
ambiguous or imprecise terms in the statute that grants the agency its
legal powers. Chevron provides a good illustration. In defining "stationary source" to mean a plant, rather than an individual piece of combustion equipment, the EPA did not "interpret" the statutory language by
determining that Congress intended "stationary source" to mean a
plant. Congress used the imprecise term "stationary source" without
defining the term at all. The EPA decided, as a matter of policy, that it
would interpret "stationary source" to mean a plant because, in the
agency's view, such an interpretation would further Congress' conflicting goals."1 In addition, as the Supreme Court recognized, the agency's
choice of policy was influenced by the President's political philosophy.32
Once a court realizes that it is reviewing an agency's resolution of a
policy issue, rather than an issue of law, comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that the agency is a more appropriate institution
than a court to resolve the controversy. Because agencies are more accountable to the electorate than courts, agencies should have the domi29. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also The Role of Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation:A Discussion Between Judge
Kenneth W. Starr and Judge Abner J. Mikva, 1987 DuKE L.J. 361.
30. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
31. Understood in this manner, Chevron concerned the same type of issue as was involved in
the "airbags" case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Although the policy decision in State Farmtook the form of an
agency's decision to rescind a safety standard, while the policy decision in Chevron took the form
of an agency's interpretation of an imprecise statutory provision, the distinction is functionally
irrelevant. Contrary to Judge Breyer's position, see supra note 17, both State Farm and Chevron
involved an agency's resolution of a policy issue.
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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nant role in policy making when the choice is between agencies and
courts." A court's function in reviewing a policy decision made by an
agency should be the same whether the agency policy decision is made
by interpreting an ambiguous statutory provision or by any other
means of agency policy making. The court should affirm the agency's
policy decision, and hence its statutory interpretation, if the policy is
"reasonable." The court should reverse the agency's policy decision if
the policy is arbitrary and capricious. Of course, in deciding whether
the agency's policy decision is "reasonable," the court should review the
agency's decision making process by which the agency determined that
its choice of policy was consistent with statutory goals and the contextual facts of the controversy in question.
This characterization of the nature of statutory interpretation by
an agency is entirely consistent with the Court's two-step approach to
judicial review of agency interpretations of statutory provisions established in Chevron. The first step under Chevron is for the court to determine if Congress has resolved the policy issue that corresponds to
the interpretive issue resolved by the agency. The court should engage
in "real" statutory interpretation to determine whether Congress resolved the specific issue that the agency purported to resolve through
statutory interpretation. If Congress resolved the specific issue
presented, the court is dealing with an issue of law, and the case is at an
end because the court is limited to implementing congressional intent.
In the process of applying Chevron's first step, the court should
refrain from teasing meaning from the statute's ambiguous or conflicting language and legislative history; it should eschew the process of
"creative" statutory interpretation that is otherwise essential and appropriate in judicial decision making. Creative statutory interpretation
is not appropriate in the administrative law context because creative
statutory interpretation permits judges to make policy decisions that
should be made instead by agencies. If the process of "real" statutory
interpretation does not produce a determination that Congress resolved
the specific issue, the court is dealing with a policy decision made by an
agency. Although the court still must insure that the agency made its
policy decision through a process of reasoned decision making, the
court's role should be influenced greatly by the recognition that it is
reviewing a policy decision made by another branch of government.34
33.

Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional

Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1984); Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985); Pierce, Political Theory, supra
note 16, at 504-13; see also Breyer, supra note 11, at 388-97; Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986).
34. See Breyer, supra note 11, at 382-97.
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The Chevron approach can be illustrated in the context of the D.C.
Circuit's recent decision in Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,3 5 which involved the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act. The Atomic
Energy Act requires the NRC "to ensure that any use or production of
nuclear materials 'provide[s] adequate protection to the health or safety
of the public.'"36 The NRC issued a rule that seemed to permit it to
consider the cost of a safety precaution in implementing this standard
in certain contexts. The Union of Concerned Scientists challenged the
rule claiming that any consideration of cost by the NRC was inconsistent with the statutory "adequate protection" standard.
The majority opinion in Union of Concerned Scientists held that
the Chevron test did not apply to the interpretation of the statutory
language at issue. 37 The majority interpreted dictum in a recent Supreme Court opinion as an indication that the Supreme Court has confined the Chevron test to circumstances in which an agency applies a
statutory term to a particular set of facts. The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Chevron seems inherently implausible, since Chevron did not
even involve application of statutory language to a specific set of facts. 8
Nevertheless, once the majority in Union of Concerned Scientists
concluded that Chevron did not apply, it felt free to "use traditional
tools of statutory construction to ascertain congressional intent." 39 The
majority then held that Congress intended to preclude the NRC from
taking cost into account in the implementation of the adequate protection standard. 0 Its evidence of congressional intent necessary to support this holding is extraordinarily meager. The majority referred to
several ambiguous excerpts from the statute's lengthy legislative history4 1 and buttressed that flimsy manifestation of congressional intent
with evidence that Congress did not explicitly authorize the NRC to
42
consider costs.
As an exercise in pure policy making, the majority in Union of
Concerned Scientists may persuasively argue that the NRC should not
consider costs in setting safety standards. As an exercise in "real" statutory interpretation, however, the majority opinion is not persuasive.
Congress' use of the adjective "adequate" in the regulatory statute sug35. 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
36. Id. at 114 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1982)).
37. Id. at 113.
38. The case relied upon by the majority of the D.C. Circuit, however, may be interpreted as
a decision to reduce the scope of Chevron. See supra note 15.
39. Union of Concerned Scientists, 824 F.2d at 113.
40. Id. at 117.
41. Id. at 115-16.
42. Id. at 115.
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gests that it intended for the NRC to have some discretion in determining how much protection to accord the public.4 One of the most
obvious means of determining the adequacy of a safety measure is to
compare its beneficial effects on safety with its costs.44 The term "ade-

quate," however, could just as easily support any number of alternative
meanings. The evidence of congressional intent amassed by the majority seems far more consistent with a conclusion that Congress did not
resolve the policy issue of whether and to what extent the NRC can
consider costs in requiring safety precautions. The majority in Union of
Concerned Scientists engaged in "creative" statutory interpretation,
and, as is almost invariably the case when courts engage in "creative"
statutory interpretation, the judges interpreted the ambiguous statutory language to require a policy consistent with their personal political
45
philosophies.
The concurring opinion in Union of Concerned Scientists argued
persuasively that Chevron does apply to the NRC's interpretation of
the phrase "adequate protection" and that Congress did not resolve the
issue of whether the NRC can consider costs in determining the degree
of protection to incorporate in the NRC's safety standards." If all three
judges had applied the Chevron test in Union of Concerned Scientists,
the court would have held unanimously that Congress did not resolve
the issue presented. The court then would have addressed the question
of whether the NRC's policy was reasonable.
The Chevron test represents a framework for judicial decision making that could change the results of judicial review in many cases. The
principal effect of the Chevron two-step is to allocate policy making responsibility from judges to agencies-an effect with significant bene47
fits.

Under the Chevron analysis, several Supreme Court cases decided

43. Id. at 114 (indicating that the Atomic Energy Act "allows the NRC to consider costs in
devising or administering requirements that offer protection beyond [the adequate protection]
level").
44. See Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation,
33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1314-17 (1980). Even the most ardent critics of cost-benefit analysis recognize that an agency must consider costs in some manner. See McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 159, 197-99.
45. The interpretation of statutes, court decisions, and even provisions of the Constitution in
accordance with each judge's political philosophy is becoming a significant problem on the D.C.
Circuit. A democratic and a republican interpretation seemingly exists for everything. See Bartlett
ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (joint statement of Bork, Starr,
Buckley, Williams & D.H. Ginsburg, J.J., accompanying per curiam orders) (purely partisan division of judges in three consolidated cases, with each side accusing the other of engaging in "sweeping and revolutionary" changes in legal doctrine).
46. 824 F.2d at 121 (Williams, J., concurring).
47. See Pierce, PoliticalTheory, supra note 16, at 506; Mashaw, supra note 33, at 94.
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prior to Chevron probably would have been decided differently. For instance, serious doubt exists that Congress actually intended to require a
finding by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
that a toxic substance presents a "significant risk" before OSHA can
regulate that substance, as a four Justice plurality of the Supreme
Court held in the Benzene case.48 Similarly, it is unlikely that Congress
actually intended to preclude OSHA from taking costs into account in
determining the permissible level of exposure to toxic substances in the
workplace, as a five Justice majority of the Court held in the Cotton
Dust case.49 Based on the ambiguous language of the statute and the
legislative history cited in the multiple opinions in both Benzene and
Cotton Dust, it seems far more likely that Congress simply did not resolve the policy issues addressed by OSHA in either of those cases.
If the Supreme Court had adopted the Chevron test before it decided Benzene and Cotton Dust, the Court probably would have resolved each case with a single unanimous opinion. Instead, the political
liberals on the Court tortured the statutory language and legislative history to support an interpretation consistent with their political philosophy, while the political conservatives on the Court engaged in a similar
effort to support their preferred resolution of the policy issue. The
dominance of judges' personal political views in the pre-Chevron process of policy making is both inappropriate and unnecessary in the ad50
ministrative law context.
Ironically, the Chevron test also helps to reconcile some of the Supreme Court's prior decisions that are cited as examples of the Court's
prior inconsistent approach to judicial review of agency interpretations
of statutory provisions.51 In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.52 the
Court affirmed the National Labor Relations Board's interpretation of
the term "employee" in the National Labor Relations Act to include
newsboys, although newsboys are characterized as independent contractors for other purposes. The Court deferred to the agency's interpretation, holding that an agency's interpretation of a statutory provision
must be affirmed if it has "a reasonable basis in law."53 In NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. 54 a majority of the Court reversed the same agency's in48. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); see Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 16, at 475-77.
49. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); see Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 16, at 475-78.
50. See supra sources cited in note 33.

51. See, e.g., J. MASHAW & P. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYsTEM 252-67 (2d ed. 1985).
52. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
53. Id. at 131.
54. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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terpretation of "employee" to encompass some managerial employees

who have no industrial relations role. In reversing the agency's interpretation, the Court relied upon the language and legislative history of the
National Labor Relations Act. 5 In light of Chevron, Hearst and Bell
Aerospace may have been decided both correctly and consistently; Congress may have decided explicitly to exclude all managerial personnel
from the protections of the labor laws, but may not have decided
whether to exclude all independent contractors from those protections.
Several consequences logically follow from this Essay's interpretation of Chevron and characterization of the nature of the issues
presented to courts when they review agency interpretations of statutory terms. First, courts should apply the Chevron test to all agency
interpretations of provisions in the statutes that grant the agency its
legal power. Courts should not confine the test to the unique context of
agency applications of statutory terms to specific factual situations."
Indeed, according agencies deference when they apply statutory terms
to specific facts but not when they define terms in general rules would
create incentives for an agency to make policy through adjudication
rather than through rule making. Yet, virtually all judges and administrative law scholars agree that agencies should make policy through rule
57
making procedures rather than through adjudication.
Second, courts should refrain from attempting to tease meaning
from ambiguous statutory language and legislative history if the statute
at issue establishes a regulatory scheme that is to be implemented by
an agency. Agencies are more appropriate institutions to resolve policy
issues than courts, which should avoid "creative" interpretation of regulatory statutes administered by agencies.
Third, when a court concludes that Congress left unresolved a policy issue in a statute that is not administered by an agency, the court
should acknowledge explicitly that it must resolve the policy issue Congress raised but declined to resolve. In resolving that policy issue, the
court should refer to Congress' goals. This is not to say, however, that
the court's job is to determine congressional intent. If Congress did not
resolve the policy issue, the court must undertake its own resolution of
the issue in light of Congress' goals. Forthright recognition by a court
that it is resolving a policy issue is likely to yield better policy than
judicial resolution of policy issues through a process disguised as statutory interpretation.
55. Id. at 274-84.
56. But see Union of Concerned Scientists, 824 F.2d at 113.
57. See, e.g., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, at § 6.38 (2d ed. 1978); J. MASHAW & P. MERRILL,
supra note 51, at 273-316, 385-413; R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 16, at 281-85.
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Fourth, since many statutory interpretation issues are actually issues of policy rather than issues of law, an agency should have the ability to change its prior "interpretation" of a statutory provision. For
example, an agency should possess the legitimate power to reassess its
goals and policies in light of a change in presidential administrations. 8
This power to reassess an agency's policies should apply to agency policy making through interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions as
well as through the rule making process. Thus, if the next President
appoints an EPA administrator who believes that the bubble concept
requires an inordinate sacrifice of air quality goals, the administrator
should have the discretion to redefine "stationary source" to refer to
each piece of combustion equipment. Because Congress chose not to resolve that policy issue, the agency head may appropriately resolve the
policy question in a manner consistent with the President's political
philosophy "[a]s long as [he] remains within the bounds established by
Congress." 59 Different agency heads appointed by Presidents with different political philosophies might reasonably reach different conclusions with respect to that policy issue.
Fifth, if courts apply the Chevron test universally, judges will have
less room to infuse their personal political philosophies in the Nation's
policy making process. The Chevron test will allow judges of widely differing political perspectives to agree in a large number of cases that
Congress did or did not resolve a particular policy issue. This agreement should reduce the unfortunate tendency of judges to engage in
policy making disguised as interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. The traditional approach to judicial review of agency interpretations frequently required judges to search for congressional intent with
respect to a policy issue when, in fact, Congress had not made a decision on that policy issue. Such a search is illusory, of course, and invites
judges to "interpret" creatively ambiguous language in accordance with
their own political philosophies.
Sixth, the Chevron test notwithstanding, courts still will confront
difficult cases in the process of reviewing agency interpretations of statutory provisions. In some instances courts will legitimately disagree as
to whether Congress resolved the specific policy issue addressed by the
agency's interpretation. The second part of the Chevron test also will
present some difficulty. Often judges will differ on the question of
whether an agency's decision to adopt a particular policy is reasonable
or arbitrary and capricious.
58.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)

(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id.
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The conceptual framework established by Chevron will not eliminate all difficult cases; nor will it eliminate completely the influence of
each judge's personal political philosophy on the process of judicial review of agency actions. Those goals are unattainable through any
means. They are important goals, however, and the Chevron framework
provides a means to further those goals incrementally. The Chevron
framework can reduce the number of difficult cases that courts must
face and limit the influence of each judge's personal political philosophy
on the process of policy making in the modern administrative state.

